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Scientific evidence alone is not sufficient basis for
health policy
Keith Humphreys and Peter Piot argue that basing health policy solely on evidence is inherently
contrary to the essence of policy development and even potentially dangerous
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Articles recently published in Addiction1-6 have reignited debate
about David Nutt’s 2009 conflict with the then UK home
secretary, Alan Johnson. After Professor Nutt publicly accused
the government of ignoring science when formulating drug
policy (for example, by overestimating the dangers of ecstasy),
he was sacked as UK drug policy adviser. As with other
contentious issues such as heroin prescribing, needle exchange,
and sex education, many scientists think that the lesson of the
Nutt controversy is that we must take the politics out of health
policy decisions and simply “do what the science says.” Based
on experience as researchers and as policy makers at the White
House and United Nations, we argue that although science
should inform health policy, it cannot be the only consideration.
How science should inform health policy
Science can and must inform health policy decisions in several
ways, including by identifying emerging problems. The
discovery of new types of influenza virus, for example, or of
smoking as a cause of cancer made policy makers aware of
grave threats to health. The documentation of the first cases of
AIDS and of the emerging epidemic of methamfetamine
addiction in the western United States provided similar
warnings.
Science can also be useful for telling policy makers which tools
are likely to produce a desired effect. For example, when the
Obama administration was looking for strategies to reduce
substance use disorders, it relied on a large literature establishing
the effectiveness of screening and brief intervention services
within general healthcare. These services were ultimately
included as an essential preventive service in the 2010 healthcare
reform and the national drug control strategy.7 8 Similarly, the
evidence that needle exchange can prevent the transmission of
HIV was the basis for UNAIDS’ support of “harm reduction”
programmes9 and the Obama administration’s rationale for
lifting the ban on federal funding for this service.10 Other
examples of evidence based interventions with potential policy
relevance include vaccines for human papillomavirus,
buprenorphine maintenance therapy for opioid dependence, and
male circumcision for the prevention of HIV. Economic research
provides further help for policy makers by allowing them to
determine the cost and cost effectiveness of interventions.
Role of factors other than scientific
evidence
Science also has limits in health policy decision making. For
example, effective policy on smoking required more than the
discovery that it is a cause of lung cancer and other diseases.
The powerful tobacco industry for years successfully denigrated
the research evidence in the public domain and suppressed its
own findings on the dangers of cigarettes.11 Substantial policy
action did not occur for several decades and was instigated not
by a new scientific breakthrough but by sustained health
activism and public interest litigation.
The decision to form policy in response to evidence of
effectiveness is made politically, not least by voters who selected
particular individuals to lead their countries. For example, the
Obama administration could have chosen not to fund screening
and brief interventions to prevent substance misuse and instead
directed the money at other interventions with evidence of
effectiveness. Although it may frustrate scientists when
politicians are swayed by the possible electoral consequences
of various policy options, few scientists (including us) would
want to live in a society in which politicians completely ignored
the views of those who have elected them as their
representatives. Voting, free speech, debate, and the push and
pull of politics must have an important role in what free societies
choose to do if the concept of democracy is to be meaningful.
We should remember that progress in public health from its
origins in the late 1800s and early 1900s has been as much
driven by politics as by scientific and technological innovation.
For example, child labour and alcohol control laws were inspired
by social justice concerns, with the scientific evidence for their
effectiveness coming later. Without constructive politics,
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historical progress in public health would have been far more
limited, as the example of AIDS illustrates more recently.12
More generally, societies have values that don’t need to be
proved in randomised controlled trials and are appropriate
over-riding considerations in policy. A rigorous study showing
that people with an infectious disease could be cheaply and
efficiently shipped off to colonies of isolation would be ignored
in any humane society because respect for human dignity would
rule out such a policy. Similarly, current research assessing
whether the death penalty is cost effective or has a deterrent
effect on crimemay someday resolve those empirical questions,13
but it can never tell us whether the taking of a helpless
individual’s life by the state is morally acceptable. That
judgment falls on all our heads and cannot be evaded by saying
that the science made us do it or stopped us from doing it.
None of this is to deny that policy decisions made without
scientific advice can be ineffective (such as, restrictions on
people with HIV entering a country). They can also lead to a
massive waste of public resources (such as the billions of pounds
spent worldwide on ineffective youth oriented programmes to
prevent drug use14) and result in humanitarian catastrophes (such
as the over 300 000 deaths resulting from President Mbeki’s
AIDS policies15). This is why the unique system of chief
scientific advisers to inform (though not control) policy making
in nearly all UK government departments is so important and
an example for other countries.
Scientists as human beings
Science is conducted by scientists, who are—thank
goodness—human. Their expertise in science does not
necessarily convey any expertise in governance (if you do not
believe us, attend a faculty meeting). This principle is implicitly
enshrined in democratic societies, where people with technical
expertise get one vote at the ballot box just like other citizens.
There are at least two reasons why this is wise.
Firstly, scientists, like all people, are wrong at least some of the
time. The scientific “fact” that seems a certain basis for policy
in one eramay be overturned by new discoveries or new research
methods. For example, many drugs that seemed to be supported
by good scientific evidence have later been found to be
ineffective or even dangerous.16 The use of thalidomide to treat
nausea in pregnant women, is one good example.
Secondly, again like all people, scientists can confuse their
opinions on policy matters with objective facts.17 The US
eugenics movement, which includedmany prominent scientists,
maintained that particular genes influence risk for mental illness,
addiction, and cognitive impairments and that scientists and
government officials should therefore attempt to eliminate such
genes from the population through selective sterilisation and
immigrant exclusion.18 Supporters of the movement failed to
appreciate that the first of these premises is an objective fact
and the second is a subjective viewpoint.
Conflating facts and values allows scientists to use their
authority inappropriately—that is, to cloak their effort to make
society live by their values as a disinterested, objective, and
unassailable stance. This may lead the public to defer to
scientists on the assumption that they know better, but in a
democracy there can be no experts on values. To allow scientists
to say that their policy proposals are determined solely by
objective science is to promote a lack of accountability.
Although scientists have a duty to be a critical voice in society
because of the privileged information and position they may
have, we do not believe that the fact that someone, for example,
received a Nobel prize for groundbreaking medical research
entitles him or her to more credibility in societal or moral
matters.
In drugs and AIDS policy, we both often hear advocates say
that policy should be based on “evidence rather than morals or
politics.” We have a higher opinion of such advocates than this
statement would suggest they have of themselves. In particular,
we respect them as people, which implies that they have values
and politics like all other human beings.Whether we agree with
them on policy substance or not, we see their commitment to
helping alleviate human suffering as an admirable moral quality.
To say that an advocate or policy maker is guided by more than
technocratic considerations is a compliment and not an insult.
Conclusion
Scientific research is an extremely valuable tool for informing
health policy decisions because it can identify emerging
problems, offer tools to tackle those problems, and forecast the
likely effect of various policy choices. This potential to inform
does not mean that democratic and human rights considerations
can or should be cast aside, hence there is no such thing as
evidence based policy, only “evidence informed” policy. Failure
to value the influence of forces other than science in forming
health policy can have dangerous consequences for the
accountability of politicians and scientists, and for the
justification of policies that violate fundamental principles in a
democratic society. We should refrain from casting so many
issues as “science versus politics” because we scientists all have
our own political commitments and values, and in that sense
we stand on the same level as our fellow citizens rather than
above them.
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